Apportionment: Shining the Light of Day on Patent Damages by Friedman, Josh
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 63 | Issue 1
2012
Apportionment: Shining the Light of Day on
Patent Damages
Josh Friedman
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of
Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Josh Friedman, Apportionment: Shining the Light of Day on Patent Damages, 63 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 147 (2012)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol63/iss1/12
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 1·2012 
147 
—  Note  — 
Apportionment: Shining the Light 
of Day on Patent Damages 
“The patentee . . . must . . . give evidence . . . to separate or 
apportion the defendant’s profits and the patentee’s damages between 
the patented feature and the unpatented features . . . .” * 
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Introduction 
This story begins with Lucent Technologies’ Day Patent.1 In 
2008, Microsoft appealed a $357 million damage award for an 
 
* Garretson v. Clark, 111 U.S. 120, 121 (1884); see also Jury Instructions at 
31, Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 3:07-cv-02000-H-CAB (S.D. 
Cal. July 29, 2011), ECF No. 1392 (using substantially identical wording). 
1. U.S. Patent No. 4,763,356 (filed Dec. 11, 1986) (the “Day Patent”). 
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infringing feature in Microsoft Outlook.2 Lucent’s patented feature 
was a method for selecting dates in a calendar using a touchscreen.  
At trial, the jury found that Microsoft infringed.3 But the jury 
then had the impossible task of calculating damages. The parties 
presented myriad evidence on the reasonable royalty rate. But several 
questions remained regarding how that rate applied to sales of 
Microsoft Outlook. Should the jury use the entire value of Microsoft 
Office, in which Outlook was bundled? What about all the other 
noninfringing products in Office, like Word and Excel—does it make 
sense to make Microsoft pay a royalty on those? How about using the 
wholesale value of standalone Outlook? What about all its nonin-
fringing e-mail and task manager components? What about the fact 
that Microsoft makes less profit when Outlook is bundled into 
Office—should sales of Office and standalone Outlook be valued 
equally? How many people really use the touchscreen features of 
Outlook? Are those features important? Should it matter? If the court 
is to apply a reasonable royalty rate, it must apply that rate to a base 
value, but what exactly is the value of the Day Patent?  
These questions confounded the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit in Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc.4 
The jury had awarded an exceedingly high lump-sum reasonable 
royalty award in excess of $350 million.5 But the jury provided no 
explanation of its methodology.6 On appeal, the Federal Circuit 
speculated that the award might have been so high because the jury 
applied its reasonable royalty rate to the entire market value of 
Office.7 The Federal Circuit, in holding that Lucent improperly used 
the “entire market value” rule8 to include other noninfringing 
components in the calculation,9 vacated this award and remanded for 
 
2. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(Microsoft was a co-defendant). 
3. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1028 (S.D. 
Cal. 2008) aff’d in part, vacated in part, 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
4. 580 F.3d 1301. 
5. The median patent damage award from 2006 to 2011 was only $4 million. 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2012 Patent Litigation Study: 
Litigation Continues To Rise Amid Growing Awareness of 
Patent Value 7 (2012) [hereinafter Patent Litigation Study], 
available at http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/forensic-services/publications/ 
assets/2012-patent-litigation-study.pdf. 
6. See Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1336 (speculating on several ways the jury 
could have calculated its award). 
7. Id. 
8. See infra text accompanying notes 47–51 (explaining the entire market 
value rule). 
9. Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1336. 
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a new trial on damages.10 But the court gave little guidance on how to 
calculate damages without the entire market value rule.11  
On remand, in Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp. 
(Lucent II ),12 the Southern District of California revived a century-
old and seldom used body of law—the law of apportionment.13 In 
particular, the court issued a jury instruction quoting language from 
the 1884 seminal apportionment case, Garretson v. Clark.14 Although 
there is an extensive jurisprudence on apportionment law, Garretson 
was decided in the context of a remedy at equity very different from 
modern damages law. Accordingly, it is unclear how old apportion-
ment cases would apply to modern cases.15 Lucent II demonstrated 
just how unclear. The court ultimately set aside the new apportionment-
based jury verdict because both parties failed to provide proper 
apportionment evidence.16 
 
10. Id. at 1340. 
11. Id. at 1339 (recognizing a request for more specific guidance on remand, 
but declining to give such guidance because “neither party at trial 
challenged any damages instruction that was given nor proposed an 
instruction and objected when it was not given”). 
12. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp. (Lucent II ), 837 F. Supp. 2d 
1107 (S.D. Cal. 2011). 
13. Black’s Law Dictionary defines apportionment generally as “[d]ivision into 
proportionate shares.” Black’s Law Dictionary 116 (9th ed. 2009). For 
the purposes of this Note, Professor Mark Lemley’s definition of appor-
tionment is most useful: “dividing out the percentage of the production 
that is attributable to the patent and, therefore, ought to be paid to the 
patent owner.” Mark A. Lemley, Professor, Stanford Law School, Panel 2 
at the Federal Trade Commission Hearing at the University of California: 
The Evolving IP Marketplace 216 (May 5, 2009) [hereinafter FTC 
Hearing], available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/workshops/ipmarketplace/ 
may4/090505transcript.pdf. 
14. Garretson v. Clark, 111 U.S. 120 (1884). Compare id. at 121 (“The 
patentee . . . must . . . give evidence tending to separate or apportion 
the defendant’s profits and the patentee’s damages between the 
patented feature and the unpatented features, and . . . the profits and 
damages are to be calculated on the whole machine, for the reason that 
the entire value of the whole machine, as a marketable article, is 
properly and legally attributable to the patented feature.”), with Jury 
Instructions at 31, Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 3:07-cv-
02000-H-CAB (S.D. Cal. July 29, 2011), ECF No. 1392 (“[T]he patentee 
. . . must give evidence to separate or apportion the defendant’s profits 
and the patentee’s . . . damages between the patented feature and the 
unpatented features . . . .”). 
15. See Eric E. Bensen & Danielle M. White, Using Apportionment to Rein in 
the Georgia-Pacific Factors, 9 Colum. Sci. & Tech. L. Rev. 1, 21 
(2008) (“[I]t is not readily apparent how a vast majority of apportionment 
cases would apply in modern patent cases.”). 
16. Lucent II, 837 F. Supp. 2d at 1126 (“[A] reasonable jury could not have 
returned a verdict in excess of $26.3 million based on the evidence of 
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The saga of the Day Patent illustrates a growing problem17 in 
patent damages law in that, in the case of complex technologies,18 
courts have no guidance when the entire market value rule does not 
apply. To put the problem most simply: damage calculations are an 
extremely fact-intensive exercise, but the current damages framework 
excludes much of the most relevant evidence. 
An apportionment finding should be added to calculate the 
reasonable royalty base and improve evidentiary practice in patent 
infringement cases.19 Apportionment was a part of damage 
calculations for over a century. But it has scarcely been used in the 
last fifty years and has never been formally applied to reasonable 
royalty calculations.  
Several scholars have addressed apportionment in the last 
decade.20 This Note first expands upon their research to explain why 
apportionment is necessary—especially in light of recent and 
disturbing trends. Then this Note details a framework for trial courts 
to apply apportionment. The apportionment proposed in this Note is 
not the apportionment of days past. Instead, it is a novel framework 
drawing on lessons from centuries of case law, problems presented by 
new technologies, and—perhaps most importantly—the evidentiary 
concerns at the heart of patent damage calculations. 
 This Note proceeds in four parts. Part I briefly traverses the 
history of patent damages and explains why there is no current 
apportionment finding in royalty calculations. Next, Part II discusses 
why such a finding is necessary and why it is compatible with current 
damages law. This Part then addresses and rebuts the biggest 
criticisms of apportionment: (1) claims by Non-Practicing Entities 
 
record.”). The parties subsequently dismissed the case, so the Federal 
Circuit will have no chance to opine on the issue. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. 
Microsoft Corp., 462 F. App’x 968 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (order of dismissal). 
17. See cases cited infra note 103 (listing recent cases in which courts have 
struggled to apportion damages or apply the entire market value rule). 
18. A complex technology is one that contains many interworking compo-
nents. See Patent Reform: The Future of American Innovation: Hearing 
on S. 1145 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 258 
(2007) [hereinafter 110 Hearing] (statement of Mary E. Doyle, Senior 
Vice President and General Counsel, Palm, Inc.) (“For example, there 
are more than 400 patents that have been claimed to be essential to 
producing a DVD, tens of thousands of patents that may relate to a 
single microprocessor and perhaps hundreds of thousands of patents that 
may relate to a personal computer.”).  
19. This Note does not address the application of apportionment to other 
forms of patent damages, such as lost profits. 
20. See infra text accompanying notes 83–89. 
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(NPEs)21 and the biotechnology industry that damage reform will 
devalue patents; and (2) claims by legal scholars, mainly Federal 
Circuit Chief Judge Paul Michel, that apportionment is impractical. 
Part III explores in detail how courts should conduct a modern 
apportionment finding. In particular, in cases where apportionment is 
warranted, courts should apply a distinct apportionment finding, 
asking the jury to return a specific percentage value based on a set of 
contextual factors. This Part also describes the kinds of evidence 
parties would present to support or mitigate apportionment factors. 
Part IV applies this newly proposed apportionment framework to 
Lucent itself, demonstrating how apportionment can remedy 
unwarranted damage awards. Finally, this Note concludes that a 
distinct apportionment finding would increase the consistency of 
patent damages and would be compatible with current damages law.  
I.  A Brief History of Patent Damages 
A brief history of patent damage law explains why courts 
currently do not use apportionment findings with reasonable royalty 
calculations.  
In the nineteenth century, a patentee claiming infringement could 
pursue either damages for lost profit in a court of law or, 
alternatively, injunction in a court of equity.22 In the latter half of the 
century, however, courts of equity began to allow patentees to recoup 
a portion of the infringer’s profits. Thus, after an injunction, the 
patentee would not have to return to a court of law to obtain 
monetary compensation.23 In 1870, Congress codified profit accounting 
as an equitable remedy and added an additional recovery for 
damages.24 But this new remedy was not without issue. Even before 
codification, courts understood that a patentee of a component should 
 
21. NPEs, colloquially known as “patent trolls,” are companies that buy, 
sell, and license patents but do not manufacture or sell the commercial 
embodiments of those patents. See, e.g., IP Innovation, L.L.C. v. 
Ecollege.com, 156 F. App’x 317, 324 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (noting that the 
defendant accused the plaintiff “of being a patent ‘troll’ that sought to 
exact a settlement to avoid litigation expenses”). 
22. Amy L. Landers, Let the Games Begin: Incentives to Innovation in the 
New Economy of Intellectual Property Law, 46 Santa Clara L. Rev. 
307, 313–14 (2006). 
23. Id. at 314. 
24. Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198, 206 (“[U]pon a decree being 
rendered . . . for infringement, the [patentee] shall be entitled to recover, 
in addition to the profits to be accounted for by the defendant, the 
damages the [patentee] has sustained thereby . . . .”). 
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not be entitled to profits attributable to other, unpatented parts or 
improved versions of an infringing product.25 
Over the next half-century, courts created fairly detailed 
jurisprudence requiring that a patentee prove the portion of the 
infringer’s profits that was attributable to the patented component or 
improvement.26 Profit apportionment soon led to serious problems, 
however, as courts, attorneys, and juries struggled to untangle an 
infringer’s accounting of increasingly complex machines.27  
To help patentees that could not feasibly prove a specific damage 
amount, Congress amended the patent damages statute in 1922.28 
These amendments allowed courts to award a reasonable royalty as 
damages when profits were uncertain.29 The old profit accounting 
remedy and the new reasonable royalty remedy coexisted for some 
time, but the idea of apportionment was only applied to profit 
accounting and never to reasonable royalty.30 Meanwhile, profit 
 
25. See Whitney v. Mowry, 29 F. Cas. 1102, 1104 (S.D. Ohio 1868) 
(“Suppose . . . it be a railroad car, the cost of which is thousands of 
dollars, and some little invention is made in regard to the interior 
structure of the car, or in its ornamentation, which is patentable under 
the act of 1861; yet the slight, the simple thing is such as to strike the 
public taste and judgment, and have such an effect in the commercial 
world that nobody will buy the article without that invention; yet it 
would seem to be a pretty hard measure of justice in a court of equity, 
to say that the entire profits made on that large article should go into 
the pockets of the inventor and patentee of this small thing, which had 
been used without license or authority in connection with it.”). 
26. See Garretson v. Clark, 111 U.S. 120, 121 (1884) (“The patentee . . . 
must in every case give evidence tending to separate or apportion the 
defendant’s profits and the patentee’s damages between the patented 
feature and the unpatented features . . . .” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).  
27. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Wagner Elec. & Mfg. Co., 
225 U.S. 604 (1912) (holding that a patentee was entitled to all the 
infringer’s profits because the infringer had mingled its receipts and 
made profit apportionment impossible).  
28. Patent Act of 1922, ch. 58, § 8, 42 Stat. 389, 392 (current version 
codified at 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006)). 
29. Courts had already begun to allow reasonable royalties in cases where 
damages were otherwise uncertain. See, e.g., U.S. Frumentum Co. v. 
Lauhoff, 216 F. 610, 617 (6th Cir. 1914) (allowing a “reasonable royalty” 
calculation as “damage not resting on any of the applicable, exact 
methods of computation but upon facts and circumstances which permit 
the jury or the court to estimate in a general, but in a sufficiently 
accurate, way the injury to plaintiff caused by each infringing sale”). 
30. See Alliance Sec. Co. v. De Vilbliss Mfg. Co., 76 F.2d 503, 504 (6th Cir. 
1935) (“[T]he appellant had failed to offer any evidence which would 
serve as a basis for such an apportionment or for determining damages 
and a reasonable royalty . . . .” (emphasis added)).  
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accounting problems continued to multiply. As Judge Learned Hand 
noted, “The difficulty of allocating profits in such cases has plagued 
the courts from the outset, and will continue to do so, unless some 
formal and conventional rule is laid down, which is not likely. 
Properly, the question is in its nature unanswerable.”31  
Congress overhauled the patent code in 1952,32 this time removing 
the accounting of profits remedy. In a detailed and lengthy debate, 
Congress rejected profit accounting as a “complete failure of justice” 
because “artificial and unsound rules have been invented to solve the 
impossible problem of how to apportion profits.”33 The House 
Committee on Patents found it “impossible to apportion profits” for 
an improvement in a complex machine and observed that profit 
apportionment proceedings were “always expensive [and] often 
protracted for decades.”34 The Supreme Court interpreted Congress’s 
action as fully eliminating an infringer’s profits as a form of 
recovery.35 But courts stopped short of precluding apportionment 
from reasonable royalty calculations, explicitly noting that Congress’s 
problem with apportionment was only in the context of a profit 
remedy.36 Even so, apportionment was fully put to rest in W.L. Gore 
& Associates, Inc. v. Carlisle Corp.37 The court held that “[o]nce the 
fact that sales have been lost has been proven, there is no occasion for 
the application of apportionment.”38 The W.L. Gore court did not 
address apportionment in the context of reasonable royalty. Without 
 
31. Cincinnati Car Co. v. N.Y. Rapid Transit Corp., 66 F.2d 592, 593 (2d 
Cir. 1933). 
32. Act of July 19, 1952, ch. 950, § 284, 66 Stat. 792, 813 (codified as 
amended at 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006)). 
33. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp. (Georgia-Pacific II ), 243 
F. Supp. 500, 523 n.22 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). 
34. Id. at 524 (quoting Recovery in Patent Infringement Suits: Hearing on 
H.R. 5231 Before the H. Comm. on Patents, 79th Cong. (1946)). 
35. Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 506 
(1964) (“[I]t is clear that under the present statute only damages are 
recoverable.”). 
36. Georgia-Pacific II, 243 F. Supp. at 524–25 n.22 (“[T]he strongest 
criticism of the pre-1946 system is reserved for those cases in which 
‘profits’, not a reasonable royalty, was sought. In other words, 
Congress’s attention was primarily focused on the evils attendant on the 
recovery of ‘profits’ rather than on the obstacle in the path of a patent 
owner seeking a reasonable royalty.” (emphasis added)). 
37. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Carlisle Corp. 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 353 
(D. Del. 1978). 
38. Id. at 364. 
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the profit accounting remedy, however, apportionment law has since 
lain almost entirely dormant.39 
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New 
York did consider apportionment when it created a set of fifteen 
factors to guide a jury in “hypothetical negotiation” for determining 
reasonable royalty in Georgia-Pacific.40 Specifically, Factor 13 states 
that juries should consider “[t]he portion of the realizable profit that 
should be credited to the invention as distinguished from non-
patented elements, the manufacturing process, business risks, or 
significant features or improvements added by the infringer.”41 The 
Federal Circuit, however, has rejected reliance on the Georgia-Pacific 
apportionment factor.42  
 
39. See Eric E. Bensen, Apportionment of Lost Profits in Contemporary 
Patent Damages Cases, 10 Va. J.L. & Tech., no. 8, Summer 2005, at 
¶ 3 (“[M]odern patent damages cases rarely address apportionment.”). 
Interestingly, the 1952 Patent Act retained a special profit remedy for 
infringement of design patents. Act of July 19, 1952, ch. 950, § 289, 66 
Stat. 792, 813–14 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 289 (2006)). 
Congress created a separate remedy for design patents, in part because 
apportionment produced harsh results for owners of design patents that 
added, by nature, no functional utility to a product. See Nike, Inc. v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d 1437, 1441–43 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (discuss-
ing the history of 35 U.S.C. § 289). Thus § 289 only allows for “total 
profit” and not apportioned profit. 35 U.S.C. § 289 (2006). It would 
seem that defendants facing a § 289-profit award are precluded from 
arguing apportionment. Yet in a recently filed and ongoing case, the 
defendant is arguing just that. Pacific Coast Marine Windshields Ltd. v. 
Malibu Boats, LLC, No. 6:12-cv-00033-JA-DAB (M.D. Fla. filed Jan. 10, 
2012), concerns a design patent for a boat windshield. The patentee is 
asking for § 289 profits from the sale of an entire boat, but the 
defendant is arguing for apportioning out the value of the windshield. 
See Plaintiff Pac. Coast Marine Windshields Ltd.’s Opposition to 
Defendants’ Joint Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Under 35 
U.S.C. § 289 and Supporting Memorandum Of Law at 12, Pac. Coast 
Marine Windshields Ltd. v. Malibu Boats, LLC, No. 6:12-cv-00033-JA-
DAB (M.D. Fla. Mar. 1, 2012), ECF No. 146 (“Malibu’s argument that 
this Court must apportion Malibu’s profits is contrary to the plain 
language of § 289 and the clear intent of Congress.”). The outcome of 
this issue remains to be seen. 
40. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp. (Georgia-Pacific III ), 318 
F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). The Federal Circuit has long 
established that the Georgia-Pacific factors are a sound means for 
determining reasonable royalty. See Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft 
Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“This court has sanctioned 
the use of the Georgia-Pacific factors to frame the reasonable royalty 
inquiry.”).  
41. Georgia-Pacific III, 318 F. Supp. at 1120. 
42. The Federal Circuit noted that the Georgia-Pacific court itself declined 
to apply apportionment because it found that the infringing device in 
that case, a piece of plywood, was a physical “entirety.” Fromson v. W. 
Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1988), 
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II. The Case for Apportionment 
A. Why an Apportionment Finding Is Necessary 
Damages are an inexact science.43 And reasonable royalties are by 
far the most common type of damage award in patent cases.44 
Although the Federal Circuit has adopted the Georgia-Pacific factors 
for determining reasonable royalty rate,45 there is little guidance for 
determining a base value on which to apply that royalty rate.46 For 
over a century, courts have used the entire market value rule to hold 
that a patented component part can assume the value of the entire 
infringing product in cases where the component is the substantial 
basis for entire product’s value. 
The entire market value rule can be traced back to Garretson v. 
Clark.47 Courts have since expanded the rule in several ways. In 1977, 
 
overruled on other grounds by Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer 
Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004). In 
a scathing opinion, Chief Judge Markey chastised the defendants for 
invoking the Georgia-Pacific apportionment factor considering that the 
Georgia-Pacific court itself declined to apply its own factor: “Cases 
should not be cited for mere words. What counts is what the court did 
in a cited case.” Id. 
43. Ferguson Beauregard/Logic Controls, Div. of Dover Res., Inc. v. Mega 
Sys., LLC, 350 F.3d 1327, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2003). See also Story 
Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 
(1931) (“[W]hile . . . damages may not be determined by mere 
speculation or guess, it will be enough if the evidence show[s] the extent 
of the damages as a matter of just and reasonable inference, although 
the result be only approximate. The wrongdoer is not entitled to 
complain that they cannot be measured with the exactness and precision 
that would be possible if the case, which he alone is responsible for 
making, were otherwise.”). 
44. See Patent Litigation Study, supra note 5, at 11. Reasonable royalty 
awards account for 81.9 percent of all damages awards from 2006 to 2011, 
compared to just 1.7 percent and 32.2 percent for price erosion and lost 
profits damages, respectively. As some litigants receive both reasonable 
royalties and lost profits, the total is more than 100 percent. Id. 
45. Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 
2011). 
46. See Damien Geradin & Anne Layne-Farrar, Patent Value 
Apportionment Rules for Complex, Multi-Patent Products, 27 Santa 
Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 763, 764 (2011) (“[W]hether the 
royalty base for a given patent should include only the component(s) of 
the product that the patent directly reads on or the product as a whole 
seems an important question that has been hotly debated in courts and 
also by scholars and policy-makers.” (footnotes omitted)).  
47. Garretson v. Clark, 111 U.S. 120, 121 (1884) (holding that a patentee 
could avoid apportionment of profit or damages by showing with 
“reliable and satisfactory evidence, that the profits and damages are to 
be calculated on the whole machine, for the reason that the entire value 
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for example, the United States Court of Claims held that unpatented 
plug-ins, sold with the infringing product, could be included in lost 
profit damage calculations if they were “financially dependent on the 
market created by the patented [device]” and if the patentee 
“anticipate[d] sale of such unpatented components.”48 In 1995, 
moreover, the Federal Circuit held in Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co.49 
that a patentee could include unpatented components in a lost profit 
calculation if “[a]ll the components together [are] analogous to 
components of a single assembly” or “constitute a functional unit.”50 
And although the entire market value rule was historically applied 
only to lost profits, the Federal Circuit extended it to apply to 
reasonable royalties bases.51 
But the entire market value rule has serious flaws.52 First, it 
provides little guidance for a royalty base in situations where the 
unpatented components are not financially dependent on the patented 
components. Second, it is not helpful when all the components 
together are not a functional unit. The entire market value rule thus 
creates a source of confusion for judges and juries when damage 
experts testify using different base value standards.53  
Federal Circuit Chief Judge Randall Rader, sitting by designation 
in the Northern District of New York, exposed one of the entire 
market value rule’s major flaws in Cornell University v. Hewlett-
Packard Co.54 The patent in Cornell University was for a technology 
that increases the efficiency of a computer processor. In his damage 
valuation, the patentee’s expert first attempted to use the entire PC’s 
 
of the whole machine, as a marketable article, is properly and legally 
attributable to the patented feature”). 
48. Tektronix, Inc. v. United States, 552 F.2d 343, 351 (Ct. Cl. 1977). 
Consequently, the dissent in Tektronix argued that the patent’s value 
should have been apportioned from the unpatented parts prior to 
calculating the reasonable royalty. Id. at 366 (Kashiwa, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
49. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
50. Id. at 1550. 
51. Id. at 1549. 
52. Brian J. Love, Patentee Overcompensation and the Entire Market Value 
Rule, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 263, 293 (2007) (“While commentators have 
criticized the overcompensation inherent in the ‘reasonable royalty’ 
measure of damages, the entire market value rule is a particularly 
egregious and noticeable offender.”). 
53. See, e.g., Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 
2009) (remanding for a new trial on damages). See also cases cited infra 
note 103. 
54. Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 279 (N.D.N.Y. 
2009). 
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value as the royalty base. The court prevented the patentee from 
providing testimony claiming the entire PC as the base because he 
failed to show that the patented processor function drove demand for 
the entire PC.55 Instead, because the patentee claimed the “CPU 
brick”56 as the base, the jury calculated damages based on the CPU 
brick’s value. Judge Rader, in granting the infringer’s post-verdict 
motion for remittitur, held that the patentee had further failed to 
establish that the patented process drove demand for the CPU 
brick.57 Instead, Judge Rader accepted the infringer’s argument that 
the base should be the entire market value of only the processor, 
because the processor was the “the smallest salable patent-practicing 
unit” in the device.58 Cornell is just one of many recent cases 
struggling to apply the entire market value rule to complex 
technology.59  
The entire market value rule also presents an evidentiary paradox 
to plaintiffs relying on previous licenses to prove royalty rate. 
Comparable license rates are an important guide in reasonable royalty 
 
55. Id. at 284. 
56. A “CPU brick” is the processor itself along with other ancillary 
hardware components, including cache memory, power converters, and 
temperature regulators. Id. at 283. 
57. Id. at 285. 
58. Id. at 283. It should be noted that had Judge Rader taken his reasoning 
to its logical conclusion, he would have found that the patentee also did 
not prove that its patented processor function drove demand for the 
processor itself. Indeed, Judge Rader seemingly contradicted himself 
when he said: 
Without any real world transactions, or even any discernable 
market for CPU bricks, less intrepid counsel would have wisely 
abandoned a royalty base claim encompassing a product with 
significant non-infringing components. The logical and readily 
available alternative was the smallest salable infringing unit 
with close relation to the claimed invention—namely the 
processor itself. 
Id. at 287–88 (emphasis added). After all, processor function itself is 
only a part of a computer’s larger processor that also has significant 
non-infringing components. 
59. For example, in Mirror Worlds, LLC v. Apple, Inc., 784 F. Supp. 2d 
703 (E.D. Tex. 2011), a patentee alleged that several features of Apple’s 
OS X operating system appropriated its patented file organization 
technology. The district court vacated the jury’s damage award in 
excess of $200 million dollars. Id. at 727. The judge found the patentee’s 
reasonable royalty analysis “fatally flawed” because it “did not present a 
legally sound justification for its royalty base.” Id. at 726; see also cases 
cited infra note 103.  
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calculations.60 But the Federal Circuit recently placed severe 
restrictions on the use of previous licenses as evidence.61 Specifically, 
in ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., the court held improper the use 
of bundling licenses without “factual findings that account[ ] for the 
technological and economic differences” between the licenses and the 
patent.62 And under the entire market value rule, as espoused in 
Lucent, patentees are unable to present any evidence of value outside 
the patented component without proving that the component is the 
basis for that outside value.63  
This paradox handcuffs patentees that fashion licenses based on 
the entire value of an encompassing device, rather than just the 
patented component. Under ResQNet, patentees are unable to present 
those licenses without evidence showing the difference in value 
between them and the patented device; yet patentees are 
simultaneously precluded from presenting such evidence under the 
entire market value rule. As one judge recently commented, 
[i]f [the entire market value] rule were absolute, then it would 
put [the] Plaintiff in a tough position because on one hand, the 
patented feature does not provide the basis for the customer 
demand, but on the other hand, the most reliable licenses are 
based on the entire value of the licensed products.64  
Another important benefit of apportionment for courts is ease of 
review. Even apportionment opponents recognize that “it may be 
useful to create a thorough record for appellate review.”65 As 
discussed in the Introduction, the opacity of jury decisions creates a 
serious stumbling block for the trial judge on post-verdict review and 
 
60. The first two of fifteen Georgia-Pacific factors consider “royalties 
received by the patentee for the licensing of the patent in suit” and 
“rates paid by the licensee for the use of other patents comparable to 
the patent in suit.” Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp. 
(Georgia-Pacific III ), 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); see also 
ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(explaining that “royalties received by the patentee from existing 
licenses” should be considered, but courts should “exercise vigilance” 
when analyzing this factor). 
61. ResQNet, 594 F.3d 860. 
62. Id. at 873. The court held that it was error to consider differing licenses. 
63. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 
2009). 
64. Mondis Tech., Ltd. v. LG Elecs., Inc., No. 2:07-CV-565-TJW, 2011 WL 
2417367, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Jun. 14, 2011), appeal docketed, No. 2012-
1208 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 13, 2012). 
65. See, e.g., 110 Hearing, supra note 18, at 92 (responses of Kathryn L. 
Biberstein, Senior Vice President, General Counsel, Alkermes, Inc., to 
questions submitted by Senators Specter, Coburn, Kyl, and Grassley). 
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the Federal Circuit on appellate review. An apportionment framework 
would allow parties to introduce more evidence and would require 
more detailed verdicts from the jury. 
Jury confusion over damage calculations, moreover, has led to a 
large disparity in award amounts across federal district courts.66 This 
disparity has seemingly led to forum shopping by patentees.67 
Consequently, “[e]normous damage awards continue to garner 
headlines.”68 Jury awards now vastly exceed the typical award given 
in a bench trial.69 These inconsistencies have induced patentees to 
select protracted jury trials nearly four times as often as they did just 
three decades ago.70 For the first time, jury trials now eclipse bench 
trials as the preferred method of patent litigation.71 
Regardless of what courts say the entire market value rule means, 
there are two factors that would prove definitively that a patented 
component truly creates the entire value of an infringing product: 
either (1) the other components of the infringing product have no 
independent value, or (2) there are no non-infringing alternatives for 
the patented component. If any other component in the infringing 
device has value, then it is impossible to say that the patented 
component comprises the entire value.72 To hold otherwise would 
open the infringer to “royalty stacking”—a situation in which the 
infringer pays damages or licensing fees multiple times for the same 
component.73 Similarly, if the patented component can be taken out of 
the infringing device and replaced with an alternative, then the other 
components must have independent value because they have 
 
66. The median damage awards from 1995 to 2011 ranged from $151,392 in 
the Middle District of Florida to $36,025,989 in the Eastern District of 
Virginia. Patent Litigation Study, supra note 5, at 23. 
67. For example, the Delaware District Court, having the second highest 
median damage award, saw 168 patent cases from 1995 to 2011. In 
contrast, the Middle District of Florida, ranked fifteenth in median 
damage award, saw only 28. Id. at 24. 
68. Id. at 8. 
69. From 2006 to 2011, jury award amounts exceeded bench trial amounts 
by a factor of 21.8. Id. at 10. This is not to say that jury awards are 
incorrect, only that they differ largely from bench awards. See infra text 
accompanying notes 131–32 (presenting empirical evidence showing that 
jury awards are not exceedingly high in complex trials). Also, if jury 
awards are high, it may be due to a lack of proper evidence upon which 
to form a suitable damage award. 
70. Patent Litigation Study, supra note 5, at 9. 
71. Id. 
72. Love, supra note 52, at 274. 
73. Id. at 280. For an in-depth discussion of royalty stacking, see Mark A. 
Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 Tex. 
L. Rev. 1991 (2007).  
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functional utility without the patented component.74 Yet the entire 
market value rule goes far beyond these factors, perhaps because 
courts have no alternative framework for determining a royalty base. 
B. The Wide Support for an Apportionment Finding 
A simple three-step approach to reasonable royalty calculations, 
including a distinct apportionment finding, has found support in 
Federal Circuit case law, previously proposed congressional legislation, 
and academia. 
In Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., the Federal Circuit 
expressly stated that, with respect to damage calculations, “the 
Court’s concern has been two-fold: [(1)] determining the correct (or at 
least approximately correct) value of the patented invention, when it 
is but one part or feature among many, and [(2)] ascertaining what 
the parties would have agreed to in the context of a patent license 
negotiation.”75 This language essentially lays out an apportionment 
calculation. The Court further recognized that “the base used in a 
running royalty calculation can always be the value of the entire 
commercial embodiment, as long as the magnitude of the rate is 
within an acceptable range (as determined by the evidence).”76 Thus, 
under Lucent, it would appear appropriate to begin with the entire 
market value, but lower the royalty rate with an apportionment 
multiplier.77 
But, in Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., the Federal Circuit 
dismissed a patentee’s argument that, under Lucent, a plaintiff could 
use an entire market value base if the royalty rate was low enough.78 
The court reasoned that, under current jurisprudence, a plaintiff could 
use the entire market value only if he “prove[d] that the patent-
related feature is the basis for customer demand.”79 As discussed later 
in Part III.A, the apportionment proposed in this Note is not merely a 
shifted royalty rate and is consistent with existing case law on the 
entire market value rule. 
 
74. Love, supra note 52, at 276. 
75. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 
2009). 
76. Id. at 1338–39.  
77. See id. at 1339 (“There is nothing inherently wrong with using the 
market value of the entire product, especially when there is no 
established market value for the infringing component or feature, so long 
as the multiplier accounts for the proportion of the base represented by 
the infringing component or feature.”).  
78. Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 
2011). 
79. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1336). 
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Apportionment has also found congressional support. A two-step 
damages process incorporating apportionment was proposed in the 
2005, 2007, and 2009 House patent reform bills.80 Each bill contained 
similar language. But the 2005 House bill, in particular, contained 
apportionment-like language.81 Moreover, because the current patent 
damages statute expressly allows expert testimony concerning 
reasonable royalties, expert testimony on apportionment is within 
legal limits.82 
A two step-process including apportionment has also garnered 
wide support in academic circles. In a recent panel before the FTC, 
professors of law and economics, lawyers, and businesspeople all 
voiced support for an apportionment calculation.83 When asked about 
apportionment for reasonable royalties, distinguished Stanford law 
professor Mark Lemley replied, “you’ve got to do apportionment. And 
to some extent, of course courts always already do apportionment in a 
reasonable-royalty case, they just don’t do it very well.”84 He noted 
that, although apportionment is considered in one of the Georgia-
Pacific factors, “we never really pay a lot of attention to it.”85 Lemley 
described the current damages process as “fighting over broader 
versus narrow royalty bases and what the right percentage of that 
royalty base is without any context, without any specific evidence 
about what the other contributors to the value of the product are.”86  
Similarly, legal scholars Eric Bensen and Danielle White wrote 
that “apportionment should be the threshold question in every 
 
80. H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 6(1)(B) (2005); H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. 
§ 5(b)(2) (2007); H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. § 5(c)(1)(C) (2009). None of 
these bills were passed into law. Damages reform was not included in 
the recently passed America Invents Act. Leahy-Smith America Invents 
Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
81. H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 6(1)(B) (2005) (“In determining a reasonable 
royalty in the case of a combination, the court shall consider, if relevant 
and among other factors, the portion of the realizable profit that should 
be credited to the inventive contribution as distinguished from other 
features of the combination, the manufacturing process, business risks, 
or significant features or improvements added by the infringer.”). 
82. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006) (“The court may receive expert testimony as an 
aid to the determination of damages or of what royalty would be 
reasonable under the circumstances.”). 
83. FTC Hearing, supra note 13. 
84. Id. at 215. 
85. Id. at 216; see also Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 
1332 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“The parties presented little evidence relating to 
Factor 13.”). 
86. FTC Hearing, supra note 13, at 217 (emphasis added). 
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reasonable royalty analysis.”87 They argued that treating apportion-
ment as a mere factor in the royalty calculation is insufficient because 
a hypothetical negotiation would never result in the infringer giving 
all of its profit to the patentee of just one component.88 Finally, 
Richard Gilbert, professor of economics at UC Berkeley, noted that 
although there was no “magic formula” for apportionment, “in any 
serious, complicated case it’s going to have to be an individual 
investigation of the factors.”89 
Courts and scholars are not the only parties to support 
apportionment and acknowledge problems with the entire market 
value rule. Some industries, mainly complex technologies and 
software, widely support apportionment.90 Mary Doyle, Vice President 
of Palm, Inc., noted that patent litigation against Palm has risen 
sharply in recent years91 and worried that the entire market value rule 
is an excessive and poor method of damage valuation.92 Likewise, 
John Squires, Chief Intellectual Property Counsel for Goldman Sachs, 
testified that “apportionment of damages is critical in the overall 
patent infringement analysis.”93 Squires worried that current damages 
law encourages law firms to engage in “predatory litigation-abuse 
behavior for purely economic gain.”94 Finally, David Westergard, 
 
87. Bensen & White, supra note 15, at 1. 
88. Id. at 32–33.  
89. FTC Hearing, supra note 13, at 220–21. 
90. See, e.g., 110 Hearing, supra note 18, at 103 (statement of Mary E. 
Doyle) (stating that Palm “faces both sides of th[e] issue, as a patent 
holder and as an accused infringer,” and that apportionment “will 
restore balance to the patent system by properly valuing inventors’ 
contributions”). 
91. Id. at 107 (“As of January, 2000, only one patent litigation case was 
pending against the company. In the subsequent seven years, the 
company has been sued 19 times more for patent infringement, 11 of 
which cases were filed in the last three years.”); see also Patent 
Litigation Study, supra note 5, at 6 (noting that the number of 
patent actions filed in 2011 increased 22 percent over 2010). 
92. Mary Doyle described the trouble with the entire market value rule as 
follows: 
[E]veryone gets themselves all tangled up in their underwear, so 
to speak, by saying: Well, I would never buy a car without a 
windshield wiper or an intermittent windshield wiper, whatever 
the variation on the theme is today. Well, okay, you wouldn’t, 
but you wouldn’t buy a car without tires and an engine and 
1700 other things either. 
FTC Hearing, supra note 13, at 223–24. 
93. 110 Hearing, supra note 18, at 171 (statement of John A. Squires). 
94. Id. 
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Director of Patent Licensing at Micron Technology, argued that 
apportionment “clears up the potential jury ambiguity” and that “we 
need a more clearly articulated standard so that juries appreciate 
what is necessary to be entitled to the entire market value rule.”95 
C. Apportionment’s Criticisms and Alternatives 
Apportionment has three main criticisms. First, NPEs96 and 
pharmaceutical companies97 believe that apportionment will lower 
average patent damages and thus devalue their patents. Second, some 
scholars, most notably former Federal Circuit Chief Judge Paul 
Michel, argue that apportionment would be impractical.98 Finally, a 
few scholars suggest that no change is needed because market 
principles or post-verdict review can remedy improper damage 
awards.99 These criticisms are addressed in turn below. 
1. Apportionment’s Effect on Patent Values 
Biotech opponents of apportionment present a doomsday scenario 
where lower patent damages would disincentivize investment and kill 
innovation.100 In doing so, the industry points to studies predicting 
significant losses in research and development funds.101 But these 
studies were produced by those industries opposing apportionment, 
 
95. Id. at 183 (statement of David Westergard). 
96. Id. at 34–35 (statement of Bruce G. Bernstein, Chief Intellectual 
Property and Licensing Officer, InterDigital Commc’ns Corp.) 
(“[A]pportionment would encourage free-riders and even existing 
licensees to risk litigation rather than pay, or continue paying, a 
market-negotiated licensing fee.”). It should be noted that the 
manufacturing industry also opposed apportionment in the 2009 bill, 
but did not explain why. Id. at 282 (letter from the National 
Association of Manufacturers). 
97. See id. at 27–28 (statement of Kathryn L. Biberstein) (arguing that 
apportionment will stifle investment in biotechnology). 
98. See, e.g., id. at 278 (statement of Paul Michel, C.J.) (arguing that 
courts are “ill-equipped” to handle apportionment). 
99. See discussion infra Part II.C.3. 
100. See, e.g., 110 Hearing, supra note 18, at 98 (statement of Kathryn L. 
Biberstein) (“Innovative research into the development of innovative 
environmental products, clean and renewable biofuels, and disease-, 
pest- and drought-resistant crops will be diverted into less risky projects 
because there is little if any deterrence to infringement.”); id. at 231 
(letter on behalf of multiple industries, mainly biotech) (“The harm to 
investment in tomorrow’s technologies would be felt immediately, and 
would hurt U.S. competitiveness for years to come.”). 
101. See, e.g., Scott Shane, The Likely Adverse Effects of an 
Apportionment-Centric System of Patent Damages 4–5 (2009) 
(paper prepared for the Manufacturing Alliance on Patent Policy), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/iphearings/540872-00014.pdf. 
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and their methodologies have been called into question.102 Even if the 
studies were accurate, these critics still miss the point. The number of 
cases resulting in excessive awards or misapplication of the entire 
market value rule has risen sharply in recent years—especially in the 
computer technology area.103 Thus, lower damages awards may not be 
an assault on patent strength, but rather an attempt to bring patent 
damages back to a reasonable level.  
102. Amy Landers presents a thorough debunking of the Shane report. Amy 
L. Landers, Patent Claim Apportionment, Patentee Injury, and 
Sequential Invention, 19 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 471, 507–09 (2012). 
103. In 2007, an apportionment opponent testified before Congress that other 
than Lucent, “only one other case—an unpublished and thus non-
precedential opinion by the Federal Circuit—arguably misapplied the 
entire market value rule.” 110 Hearing, supra note 18, at 34 (statement 
of Bruce G. Bernstein). But a case need not invoke the entire market 
value rule to struggle with apportionment issues. See, e.g., Eolas Techs. 
Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1939, 1942 (N.D. Ill. 
2004) vacated in part, 399 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“[Software] 
bundling makes it very difficult for either party to assess the value of 
each individual component.”). 
Moreover, in the few years since the 2007 hearing, the number of 
such cases has exploded. See, e.g., Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 
632 F.3d 1292, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (affirming the grant of a new trial 
on damages for an award of nearly $400 million for a software copy 
protection technology); ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860, 
873 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (vacating a damage award of $500,000 for a remote 
computer login technology); Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp. 
(Lucent II ), 837 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1110 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (granting 
motion for remittitur or new trial on remand after another excessive 
award for the Day Patent); Mirror Worlds, L.L.C. v. Apple, Inc., 784 F. 
Supp. 2d 703, 731 (E.D. Tex. 2011) (granting remittitur on a damage 
award of nearly $210 million for a method of organizing documents on a 
computer screen); Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 
2d 279, 293 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) (granting remittitur on a damage award in 
excess of $180 million on a process for increasing the speed and efficiency 
of a computer processor).  
Costly debates over the entire market value rule’s applicability have 
also multiplied. See, e.g., Inventio AG v. Otis Elevator Co., No. 06 Civ. 
5377 (CM), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88965, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 22, 
2011) (granting the defendant’s motion in limine because the patentee’s 
expert applied the wrong standard for the entire market value rule); 
Mondis Tech. Ltd. v. LG Elecs., Inc., No. 2:07-CV-565-TJW-CE, 2011 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78482, at *17–20 (E.D. Tex. June 14, 2011) (allowing 
evidence on the entire market value and noting that a strict reading of 
current entire market value rule jurisprudence would forbid the patentee 
from presenting evidence of licenses based on a product’s entire market 
value); Rolls-Royce PLC v. United Techs. Corp., 1:10cv457 
(LMB/JFA), 2011 WL 1740143, at *7 (E.D. Va. May 4, 2011) 
(excluding expert reports that failed to satisfy requirements of the entire 
market value rule); IP Innovation L.L.C. v. Red Hat, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 
2d 687, 691 (E.D. Tex. 2010) (excluding expert testimony for “failing to 
account for the economic realities of [the] claimed component as part of 
a larger system”). 
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Further, much of the criticism from biotech came in response to the 
prior art subtraction language of the 2009 patent reform bill.104 
Although apportionment in the failed patent reform bill of 2005105 was 
closer to the idea proposed in this Note, the bills of 2007106 and 2009107 
contained radically different language applying “prior art subtrac-
tion.”108 The language of the 2007 and 2009 bills was largely responsible 
for the strong opposition to apportionment at that time109 and likely 
the reason damage reform was ignored altogether in the America 
 
104. For example, Kathryn Biberstein posed the example of the Post-It note 
to show the inherent dangers of prior art subtraction as follows: 
Post-It notes have two components: (1) scraps of paper; and (2) 
a glue that enables a user to peel apart the glued together scraps 
of paper from the pad without damaging the paper. Ordinarily, 
one would pay no more than a few pennies for either the scraps 
of paper or for the glue. Yet, a pad of Post-It notes costs over a 
dollar. The reason is the combination of the glue and paper has 
a value that is worth much more than the value of the 
components alone. 
110 Hearing, supra note 18, at 117. 
105. H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 6(1)(B) (2005) (“In determining a reasonable 
royalty in the case of a combination, the court shall consider, if relevant 
and among other factors, the portion of the realizable profit that should 
be credited to the inventive contribution as distinguished from other 
features of the combination, the manufacturing process, business risks, 
or significant features or improvements added by the infringer.”). 
106. H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. § 5(b)(2) (as introduced in Senate, Sept. 10, 
2007) (“[T]he court shall conduct an analysis to ensure that a reasonable 
royalty . . . is applied only to that economic value properly attributable 
to the patent’s specific contribution over the prior art. The court shall 
exclude from the analysis the economic value properly attributable to 
the prior art, and other features or improvements, whether or not 
themselves patented, that contribute economic value to the infringing 
product or process.”). 
107. H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. § 5(c)(1)(C) (2009) (“[T]he court shall conduct 
an analysis to ensure that a reasonable royalty is applied only to the 
portion of the economic value of the infringing product or process 
properly attributable to the claimed invention’s specific contribution 
over the prior art. In the case of a combination invention whose 
elements are present individually in the prior art, the contribution over 
the prior art may include the value of the additional function resulting 
from the combination, as well as the enhanced value, if any, of some or 
all of the prior art elements as part of the combination, if the patentee 
demonstrates that value.”). 
108. 110 Hearing, supra note 18, at 27 (statement of Kathryn L. Biberstein). 
109. See, e.g., id. at 57 (statement of Bruce G. Bernstein) (“This proposed 
‘subtraction’ language appears to be nothing more than a thinly veiled 
attempt to severely minimize (and potentially effectively eliminate) the 
cost of infringement.”). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 1·2012 
Apportionment: Shining the Light of Day on Patent Damages 
166 
Invents Act110—the largest patent reform bill in at least half a 
century.111 Although prior art subtraction should be a part of an 
apportionment calculation, it is not the only part. Further, recognizing 
the unique value of small contributions in biotech, this Note’s proposed 
framework specifically addresses the biotech industry and affords it 
special consideration in apportionment calculations.112 
Like the biotechnology industry, NPEs face real economic harm 
from apportionment. The NPE argument against apportionment is 
simple: (1) NPEs do not make products, so the value of their 
patents—and hence their business model—relies largely on the 
damages they could get at trial; (2) apportionment will lower overall 
damage awards; and (3) apportionment will therefore cause economic 
loss for NPEs.113 But while the economic harm is real, NPEs ignore 
the fact that “[o]ver the last decade, median damage awards for NPEs 
have significantly outpaced those of practicing entities.”114 Further, 
NPEs are increasingly disfavored by courts.115 Apportionment will 
simply bring NPE damages in line with the norm. 
2. Trial Courts’ Ability to Handle Apportionment 
Judge Michel, while acting Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit, 
sent multiple letters to Congress opposing apportionment.116 
Lawmakers and apportionment opponents seized on those letters 
during debate.117 Judge Michel argued that apportionment is too 
 
110. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 
(2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
111. See generally Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the 
America Invents Act: Part I of II, 21 Fed. Cir. B.J. 435 (2012) 
(providing a thorough analysis of the America Invents Act and its 
sweeping changes to U.S. patent law); Joe Matal, A Guide to the 
Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part II of II, 21 Fed. 
Cir. B.J. 539 (2012) (continuing the previous analysis). 
112. See discussion infra Part III.A.3. 
113. See 110 Hearing, supra, note 18, at 27–28 (statement of Kathryn L. 
Biberstein) (discussing the economic impact of implementing 
apportionment damages on NPEs). 
114. Patent Litigation Study, supra note 5, at 7. 
115. Several recent Federal Circuit and Supreme Court decisions have come 
down against NPEs. See John M. Golden, Commentary, “Patent Trolls” 
and Patent Remedies, 85 Tex. L. Rev. 2111, 2012–13 (2007) 
(discussing recent cases decided against NPEs). 
116. 110 Hearing, supra note 18, at 277–81. 
117. See, e.g., id. at 37 (statement of Bruce G. Bernstein) (“InterDigital 
shares the concerns expressed by Chief Judge Michel that . . . a novel 
and complex mandatory apportionment standard is unnecessary and 
would greatly increase the cost, delays and uncertainty of patent 
infringement litigation . . . .”); id. at 226 (statement of Kathryn L. 
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difficult a task for courts—that courts are “ill-equipped” to apportion 
because “generalist judges lack experience and expertise in making 
such extensive, complex economic valuations, as do lay jurors.”118 
Judge Michel further predicted that apportionment would “require a 
new, kind of macroeconomic analysis that would be extremely costly 
and time consuming.”119  
But Judge Michel only echoes old fears raised not only in patent 
law against reasonable royalty itself, but also in comparative 
negligence and antitrust law. These fears have long been proven 
unfounded. 
Reasonable royalties are a jury’s best guess—a “hypothetical 
negotiation.”120 The Federal Circuit recently cautioned that royalty 
calculations “necessarily involve[ ] an element of approximation and 
uncertainty.”121 Courts have recognized the inherent inaccuracy of 
reasonable royalty calculations since their inception.122 Indeed, 
opponents of such damage calculations nearly a century ago made the 
 
Biberstein) (“BIO urges Committee members to carefully consider 
the . . . letter from Chief Judge Michel of the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit, which has been charged by the Congress with ensuring 
consistency in the application of patent law throughout the country.”). 
118. Id. at 278 (statement of Paul Michel, C.J.); see also id. at 279 
(“[C]onfusion and inconsistency would reign, making predictions about 
damage awards nearly impossible. Settlements would likely decline, 
while the economic analysis required would greatly lengthen trials and 
complicate appellate review.”).  
119. Id. at 281. It should be noted, given Judge Michel’s strong fear of chaos in 
the courtroom, that he has seemingly never sat on the bench for a patent 
trial—or any trial—during his long and honorable judicial career. See  
Biographical Directory of Federal Judges, Fed. Jud. Ctr., http:// 
www.uscourts.gov/judgesandjudgeships/biographicaldirectoryofjudges.aspx 
(search for “Michel”; then follow the “Michel, Paul Redmond” hyperlink) 
(last visited Sept. 2, 2012) (showing that Judge Michel has never been 
appointed to a trial bench); see also WestlawNext, http://next. 
westlaw.com (search for “advanced: JU(Michel)”; follow “Cases” hyperlink 
on the upper-left; on the left under “jurisdiction,” expand the “federal” list) 
(last visited Sept. 2, 2012) (revealing zero instances of Paul Michel sitting as 
judge for a bench trial by designation or otherwise).  
120. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 
2009). 
121. Id. at 1325 (quoting Unisplay, S.A. v. Am. Elec. Sign Co., 69 F.3d 512, 
517 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).  
122. See Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minn. Moline Plow Co., 235 U.S. 641, 647 
(1915) (“It well may be that mathematical exactness was not possible, 
but . . . that degree of accuracy is not required but only reasonable ap-
proximation, which usually may be attained through the testimony of 
experts and persons informed by observation and experience. Testimony 
of this character is generally helpful and at times indispensable in the 
solution of such problems.”). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 1·2012 
Apportionment: Shining the Light of Day on Patent Damages 
168 
same arguments Judge Michel makes today.123 Yet nearly a century 
later, reasonable royalties are the most common form of patent 
damage award.124 And their inherent inaccuracy is not forgotten. For 
decades, until just recently, parties arbitrarily began reasonable 
royalty negotiations at 25 percent, regardless of the technology at 
issue.125 But the Federal Circuit eventually held that the “25 percent 
rule of thumb is a fundamentally flawed tool . . . because it fails to tie 
a reasonable royalty base to the facts of the case at issue.”126  
Juries have also made complex damage valuations for over a 
century in comparative tort negligence.127 Critics of apportioned 
negligence a century ago also made arguments like those Judge Michel 
made to Congress.128 Yet comparative negligence has long been 
accepted in American courts.129 Even today, some scholars continue to 
argue that juries are the “primary flaw” in complex medical 
 
123. See George P. Dike, The Trial of Patent Accountings in Open Court, 36 
Harv. L. Rev. 33, 47 (1922) (addressing concerns over the “complica-
tion of issues to be tried and the evidence to be heard” by concluding 
that “[t]he best way to handle complicated problems is for the judge to 
hear the evidence, question witnesses, experts and counsel, and by 
working with them reach the decision of the case”). Dike further noted 
that “[e]ven intricate technical patent questions become amazingly 
simple when subjected to careful analysis by trained judges who have 
the power of eliminating non-essentials” and that “the time of the judge 
might actually be conserved, since the time saved in deciding the case 
would fully make up for that occupied by the trial.” Id. In fact, many 
problems leading to the demise of apportioned profits in 1952 were 
based on the inability to review the sparse evidentiary trail left by 
special masters who conducted their own independent fact-finding. Erick 
S. Lee, Historical Perspectives on Reasonable Royalty Patent Damages 
and Current Congressional Efforts for Reform, 13 UCLA J.L. & 
Tech., no. 2, Fall 2009, at 12. 
124. Patent Litigation Study, supra note 5, at 11. 
125. See Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1314–15 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011) (citing cases following the 25 percent rule). 
126. Id. at 1315. The court characterized the application of the 25 percent 
rule as “arbitrary, unreliable, and irrelevant.” Id. at 1318. 
127. See Federal Employers’ Liability Act, ch. 149, § 3, 35 Stat. 65, 66 (1908) 
(current version codified at 45 U.S.C. § 53 (2006)) (“[T]he fact that the 
employee may have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar 
a recovery, but the damages shall be diminished by the jury in 
proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to such employee.”). 
128. See 42 Cong. Rec. 4435 (1908) (statement of Rep. Henry Clayton) (“It 
is urged by some that such a provision is impracticable of 
administration and that juries will not divide the damages in accordance 
with the negligence committed by each.”). 
129. See J. Shahar Dillbary, Apportioning Liability Behind a Veil of 
Uncertainty, 62 Hastings L.J. 1729, 1733 (2011) (discussing the merits 
of contributory negligence and apportioned liability). 
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malpractice cases.130 But those criticisms have been thoroughly 
debunked.131 As one pair of scholars put it, “[j]urors do not appear to 
be as naive as some commentators have assumed.”132 
Last, jury damage apportionment has been a long-standing 
practice in anti-trust law.133 In fact, the apportionment of comingled 
trusts was the basis for patent profit apportionment in the nineteenth 
century.134 Current cases involving antitrust apportionment exhibit 
many of the same evidentiary concerns as patent damage 
apportionment, and could be used to guide the development of patent 
apportionment case law.135 
3. Is Change Even Warranted? 
Scholarly opponents of apportionment claim that no change is 
necessary for two main reasons: (1) apportionment largely ignores 
market principles; and (2) the court system is already equipped to 
 
130. Neil Vidmar, Medical Malpractice and the American Jury 3 
(1995). 
131. Vidmar provides empirical evidence and case studies questioning many 
of the strongest anti-jury arguments in medical malpractice cases—
arguments that apply equally to patent cases—including that juries 
“favor[ ] plaintiffs,” that juries are “not competent to decide the complex 
technical issues,” that juries are confused by “‘hired gun’ experts,” that 
juries are “unreliable and capricious” in their liability and damage 
decisions, and that the professionals can make better decisions on 
damages. Id. at 7. While it would be impossible to prove that juries are 
objectively beneficial to complex litigation, Vidmar concludes that 
critics’ evidence does not support their claims of jury malfeasance. Id. at 
22. Vidmar calls the critics’ charges a “major misdiagnosis.” Id. at 265. 
Further, Vidmar finds that empirical evidence does not support the 
hypothesis that objective legal professionals reach better results than a 
lay jury. Id. at 234. 
132. Id. at 158 (quoting Valerie P. Hans & Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovich, Jurors 
and Experts, 16 Advocate: The Magazine for Delaware Trial 
Lawyers 17, 20 (1994)). 
133. See, e.g., Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis. v. Marshfield Clinic, 
152 F.3d 588, 592 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that it was proper to measure 
damages by apportioning the defendant’s profits through a comparison 
of profits before and during anticompetitive activity). 
134. See Root v. Ry. Co., 105 U.S. 189, 214–15 (1881) (“The rule adopted 
was that which the court in fact applies in cases of trustees who have 
committed breaches of trust by an unlawful use of the trust property for 
their own advantage; that is, to require them to refund the amount of 
profit which they have actually realized.”). 
135. See Blue Cross, 152 F.3d at 593 (Posner, C.J.) (calling the plaintiff’s 
expert damage reports “worthless” because they failed to account for 
factors other than anticompetitive behavior that may have led to profit 
increases). 
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handle excessive damage awards through post-verdict judgments, 
remittitur, and appeal. 
First, some argue that market principles should dominate royalty 
base calculations.136 For example Martin Simpson, General Counsel 
for the University of California, suggests that apportionment should 
be treated as its own hypothetical negotiation, similar to reasonable 
royalty.137 But market principles have already been exhausted at the 
time of trial—patent disputes typically end up in trial only after 
market principles have failed. In fact, an estimated 90–95 percent of 
patent cases settle or never make it to trial.138 The courts need step in 
only once the parties have failed to arrive at a market-based solution. 
And even then, market principles should still be considered, and are, 
as a part of the framework proposed in this Note. 
Second, others argue no change is needed because damage awards 
are not trending that high,139 and the few “rogue” cases with excessive 
damages can be handled through post-verdict judgments, remittitur, 
or appeal.140 But post-verdict judgments and remittitur are often 
appealed anyway.141 And, as discussed in Part II.A, appeals and post-
verdict judgments are not useful when the trial record lacks sufficient 
evidence for review.142 
III. Applying Apportionment in Modern Cases 
Jury confusion could be minimized by application of a simple 
three-step damages calculation that asks the jury to return: (1) the 
base product at issue and its market value (“Royalty Base”), (2) the 
percentage value of the patented component using three apportion-
ment factors discussed below (“Apportionment Factor”), and (3) a 
 
136. See Elizabeth M. Bailey, Gregory K. Leonard & Mario A. Lopez, 
Making Sense of “Apportionment” in Patent Damages, 12 Colum. Sci. 
& Tech. L. Rev. 255, 271 (2011) (“An approach consistent with 
economic principles would largely eliminate damages in excess of the 
true economic value of a patent and align damages awards with 
incentives to innovate.”). 
137. FTC Hearing, supra note 13, at 232 (“[T]hat’s part of a negotiation, of 
trying to find for the parties to come to a negotiation about what a 
reasonable value is.”). 
138. Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 73, at 2030. 
139. See Landers, supra note 102, at 507–09 (debunking studies that show no 
increase in damage trends). 
140. David W. Opderbeck, Patent Damages Reform and the Shape of Patent 
Law, 89 B.U. L. Rev. 127, 130–31 (2009). 
141. See, e.g., Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1308–09 
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (involving an appeal after denial of a motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict). 
142. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
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reasonable royalty rate based on the fifteen Georgia-Pacific factors 
endorsed by the Federal Circuit, most recently in Uniloc143 (“Royalty 
Rate”). The jury’s decision would be based on expert testimony from 
both sides144 as guided by the relevant factors. To calculate damages, 
the Royalty Base, Apportionment Factor, and Royalty Rate are 
simply multiplied together. If a jury returned both a reasonable 
Royalty Rate and Apportionment Factor based on the facts, it would 
be easier for the Federal Circuit to analyze the verdict for error on 
appeal.  
This Part begins in Section A by laying out proposed 
apportionment factors. Section B discusses how this new framework is 
consistent with current entire market value rule jurisprudence. 
Finally, Section C argues that juries, rather than judges, should 
determine the apportionment value. 
A. Possible Apportionment Factors 
Cases dealing with the royalty base and the entire market value 
rule, past apportionment cases, and recent scholarly work all provide 
guidance as to the type of factors a jury should consider when 
determining the percentage apportionment value for patented 
components. The factors should reflect three central concepts: (1) a 
component’s intrinsic importance to the product at issue (“Intrinsic 
Factor”), (2) the component’s extrinsic importance to the product’s 
market value (“Extrinsic Factor”), and (3) the nature of change in 
the industry (“Industry Factor”). These factors are discussed below 
with examples of the type of evidence a party could submit for each. 
1. Intrinsic Factor: Overall Complexity of Infringing Product and 
Relative Importance of Patented Component 
The Federal Circuit rejected a patentee’s application of the entire 
market value rule in Lucent, in part because “Lucent’s expert never 
explained to the jury . . . whether the patented invention is only a 
small component or feature of the licensed product (as is the case 
here).”145 This factor is fairly simple and direct. Courts should, using 
Lucent as a guide, direct a jury to consider the complexity of the 
 
143. Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 
2011). 
144. Under Fed. R. Evid. 706(a), the court could also appoint its own 
expert damages witnesses if necessary. See Monolithic Power Sys., Inc. 
v. O2 Micro Int’l Ltd., 558 F.3d 1341, 1347–48 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (holding 
that, in a complex patent case, the district court did not abuse its 
discretion in appointing an expert witness under Fed. R. Evid. 706(a), 
but noting that such appointments are rare). 
145. Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1330.  
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infringing product and whether the patented part is “only a small 
component or feature.”146  
Chief Judge Rader, sitting by designation in the Eastern District 
of Texas, made a similar argument in IP Innovation L.L.C. v. Red 
Hat, Inc.147 In that case, the patentee sought damages based on the 
entire market value of the infringer’s operating system, which 
contained a single patented feature—the ability to create multiple 
virtual workspaces. The patentee’s expert used evidence from online 
forums, showing that some users found the virtual workspaces 
“essential” to the operating system, to claim the entire market value 
as the base.148 The infringer, on the other hand, moved to strike the 
patentee’s expert testimony, arguing that the evidence was improper 
under the entire market value rule.149 Judge Rader agreed with the 
infringer and granted the motion.150 In doing so, he found that “[t]he 
claimed invention is but one relatively small component of the 
accused operating systems. The evidence shows that the workspace 
switching feature represents only one of over a thousand components 
included in the accused products.”151 He further found that the 
“relative importance of certain other features such as security, 
interoperability, and virtualization” evidenced the patented feature’s 
“small role in the overall product.”152  
The complexity of the overall product and the relative importance 
of the patented feature should be considered by the jury when 
considering the royalty base. The type of evidence that can be offered 
by both parties in support of this factor is straightforward. For 
instance, parties could show how many components are in the device, 
what the function of each part is, and how important each component 
is to the overall function of the product. Parties can also reuse 
evidence presented in a prior Markman hearing to show where the 
claims end and the unpatented components begin.153  
This factor most resembles language in the defeated patent reform 
of 2009.154 It is essentially a prior art subtraction—what is left when 
 
146. Id. 
147. IP Innovation L.L.C. v. Red Hat, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 2d 687 (E.D. Tex. 
2010). 
148. Id. at 690. 
149. Id. at 688–90. 
150. Id. at 691. 
151. Id. at 689–90. 
152. Id. at 690. 
153. See Landers, supra note 102, at 477 (“[T]he court’s claim construction 
identifies only the inventive aspects of the claim over the prior art.”). 
154. See H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. § 5(c)(1)(C) (2009) (“[T]he court shall 
conduct an analysis to ensure that a reasonable royalty is applied only 
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the unpatented components are conceptually separated from the 
product.155 But recognizing the inherent inadequacy of prior art 
subtraction,156 this internal valuation is only one piece of a larger 
inquiry. The following external factor attempts to remedy that 
inadequacy. 
2. Extrinsic Factor: Extent to Which the Patented Feature  
Creates the Value of the Component Parts 
The classic test for invoking the entire market value rule is 
whether the patented feature is “the basis for customer demand.”157 
Often, the patented feature is simply a basis for demand, leaving a 
jury to determine some lesser royalty base without any real guidance. 
The Federal Circuit has long held that evidence of a patented 
feature’s impact on the value of unpatented components is relevant 
for a reasonable royalty calculation.158 Juries should consider the 
external pressures that drive a component’s market value. Several 
cases involving the entire market value rule provide examples of the 
types of facts a jury should consider in deciding how a patented 
feature drives demand. 
First, a patented feature can be said to drive demand when it 
allows an infringing device to be used in a new market for the first 
time. In Manufacturing Co. v. Cowing, for instance, the patented 
technology allowed gas pumps to be used in a new way.159 The 
Supreme Court found that, without the patented component, the 
infringer would not have been able to even enter the market.160 
Specifically, the Court held that if an improvement is required to 
adapt a machine to a new use, and there is no other product 
providing that use, then it is clear the infringer has secured the 
 
to the portion of the economic value of the infringing product or process 
properly attributable to the claimed invention’s specific contribution 
over the prior art.”). 
155. See Landers, supra note 102, at 477 (advocating the use of “conceptual 
separation” because prior art “must be valued and subtracted from the 
prior figure to derive the total”). 
156. See id. at 478 (“Simply because claims are based on pre-existing 
information does not mean that even the finest logic can credibly 
unravel their separate inputs.”). 
157. Lucent Techs., v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
158. See TWM Mfg. Co., v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 901 (Fed. Cir. 1986) 
(“Where a hypothetical licensee would have anticipated an increase in 
sales of collateral unpatented items because of the patented device, the 
patentee should be compensated accordingly.”). 
159. Mfg. Co. v. Cowing, 105 U.S. 253 (1881). 
160. Id. at 255. 
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advantage of a new market and that the “fruits of this advantage are 
the entire profits he has made in that market.”161  
The reasoning employed in Manufacturing Co. may be useful in 
determining apportionment values in modern products. When a 
patented component alone enables an infringing product to enter a 
new and lucrative market, its economic value to the product as a 
whole is greater. In such a case, a patentee could produce evidence 
that, without the patented component or similar non-infringing 
alternatives, the infringer’s product would be unsuccessful in 
penetrating the market at issue. Conversely, the infringer could show 
market penetration without the infringing component or similar non-
infringing alternatives already in the market. 
Second, a patentee can show that its component drives consumer 
demand with evidence that consumers buy the infringing product 
because of that patented component. Surveys detailing the impact of 
a feature on consumer decisions will be relevant.162 Indeed, in old 
apportionment cases, courts relied on consumer surveys. In Roemer v. 
Simon,163 for example, the patentee failed to present sufficient demand 
evidence. In that case, the circuit court denied damages to the creator 
of a lock for traveling bags.164 The court found that the patentee 
presented no evidence disputing that “[t]he form, material, or 
workmanship, of the bag itself may have been, and [was] quite likely 
to have been, as decisive with the purchaser as, and perhaps more so 
than, the lock.”165 More recently, Judge Rader in IP Innovation 
denied use of consumer surveys that were insufficiently tied to the 
entire market value of the product at issue.166 But even if the jury 
decides such evidence should be given little weight, this evidence 
would be useful in an apportionment calculation. 
Parties could further prove or disprove an effect on market 
demand by presenting marketing materials. These may include 
 
161. Id. 
162. See Patricia Dyck, Beyond Confusion—Survey Evidence of Consumer 
Demand and the Entire Market Value Rule, 4 Hastings Sci. & Tech. 
L.J. 209, 237 (2012) (“[C]onsumer demand survey evidence may prove 
necessary and valuable . . . as a mechanism for apportionment . . . .”). 
163. Roemer v. Simon, 31 F. 41 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1887). 
164  Id. at 42. 
165. Id. 
166. IP Innovation L.L.C. v. Red Hat, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 2d 687, 690 (E.D. 
Tex. 2010) (“[S]elected users’ statements in isolation and without a 
relationship to the actual claimed technology do not show an accurate 
economic measurement of total market demand for the switching 
feature, let alone its contribution to the demand for the entire product 
asserted as the royalty base.”). 
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product web sites, promotional content, and print advertisements,167 
but could also include product packaging, internal business plans and 
market analyses, analyst and industry reports, and articles in trade 
publications.168 If an infringing product’s seller advertises the patented 
component heavily, the patentee should be entitled to a royalty on a 
larger percentage of the base value. 
Third, the Uniloc court established that a patentee could use the 
entire market value rule if the patented feature “substantially 
create[s] the value of the component parts.”169 But even if the added 
value is not sufficiently substantial, a jury deciding a lesser royalty 
base should still consider the extent to which the patented feature 
adds value to the unpatented parts. One simple way to measure this 
added value is by comparing the profits of the infringing product to 
the profits of products that produce a similar result without 
infringing. This idea is illustrated in Metallic Rubber Tire Co. v. 
Hartford Rubber Works Co.170 In that case, the patented component 
was a tread for a tire.171 The infringer sold tires both with and 
without the infringing tread. The district court, under the old profit-
apportionment method, determined apportionment by calculating the 
difference between the profits made from selling tires with the new, 
better tread and those made from selling tires with the old tread.172 
Similarly, in P.P. Mast & Co. v. Superior Drill Co., the district court 
compared profits of an infringing seed drill to a similar drill that 
produced the same result without the infringing component.173 
Fourth, a defendant could conversely lower the patented 
component’s assigned value by providing evidence of value in the 
unpatented components. If the non-infringing components have 
substantial value on their own, then the patented component’s value 
in relation to the product as a whole must be less. The Federal 
Circuit considered a similar approach in TWM Manufacturing Co. v. 
Dura Corp., which concerned a patented truck suspension.174 The 
court affirmed a damage award that included unpatented wheels and 
 
167. Kristopher A. Boushie, Apportionment of Intellectual Property Damages 
and the Entire Market Value Rule, Fin. Valuation & Litig. Expert, 
Feb.–Mar. 2008, at 17, 18. 
168. Id. 
169. Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 
2011) (alteration in original). 
170. Metallic Rubber Tire Co. v. Hartford Rubber Works Co., 275 F. 315 (2d 
Cir. 1921). 
171. Id. at 317. 
172. Id. at 318–19. 
173. P.P. Mast & Co. v. Superior Drill Co., 154 F. 45, 53 (6th Cir. 1907). 
174. TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
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axles, noting that the lower court “could not have apportioned the 
infringing sales if such apportioning had been appropriate” because 
the defendant “did not show how many, if any, of the patented 
devices were sold alone without wheels and axles.”175 
Another case involving the value of unpatented parts, Wales v. 
Waterbury Manufacturing Co., involved a patented belt buckle 
adapted for attaching a pencil holder.176 The patentee attempted to 
recover the profits made from the attached pencil holder sold with the 
belt. The holder was not covered by the patent-in-suit. The Second 
Circuit struggled to valuate the patented buckle because the holders 
were never sold on their own and there was “no competent and 
reliable evidence . . . to show what part of the profits the defendant 
derived from the buckles and what part from the holders 
separately.”177 The court noted that the buckle was “certainly the 
dominant feature” and that “but for the use of the buckle, the buckle 
and holder would not have been a marketable device.”178 Relying on 
Garretson and its newly formed entire market value rule, the Second 
Circuit overturned the district court’s award and ordered payment of 
all profits attributable to the buckle-holder combination.179 
Fifth, non-infringing alternatives—or design arounds180—are an 
important tool for extrinsic valuation. An infringer can show that the 
patented feature does not drive consumer demand by offering 
evidence of consumer preferences for non-infringing alternatives.181 If 
consumers readily buy similar products without the patented 
component, then it is unlikely that the patented component is a 
considerable cause of demand for the infringing product. In other 
patent damage contexts it is already accepted practice to lower or 
 
175. Id. at 901. 
176. Wales v. Waterbury Mfg. Co., 101 F. 126 (2d Cir. 1900). 
177. Id. at 128. 
178. Id. 
179. Id. at 129–31. 
180. Under the “design around” doctrine, “competitors are entitled to review 
the public record, apply the established rules of claim construction, 
ascertain the scope of the patentee’s claimed invention and, thus, design 
around the claimed invention.” Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 
F.3d 1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
181. See Love, supra note 52, at 290 (“A great deal of improper application 
of the entire market value rule could be prevented if accused infringers 
were permitted to offer evidence that the patented invention at issue 
had reasonable alternatives as a means to defend against the doctrine’s 
application.”).  
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fully mitigate damages through evidence of non-infringing alterna-
tives.182 Courts undertake a similar analysis in antitrust cases.183 
Parties can also use evidence of an infringer’s projected profits to 
establish value relative to design arounds. Projected profit evidence is 
already often introduced as part of the “analytical method” of 
calculating reasonable royalty.184 In TWM the Federal Circuit 
affirmed a reasonable rate calculated by subtracting the industry’s 
standard net profit rate from the projected net profit rate of 
infringing sales.185 Similarly, parties in an apportionment proceeding 
could produce evidence of projected net profits compared to net 
profits for valuable design arounds in the industry. 
Last, parties could provide evidence of prior judgments or licenses 
covering other components of the same product.186 But under current 
entire market value rule jurisprudence, licenses covering unpatented 
components would likely be excluded from trial.187 Courts should 
allow defendants to produce such evidence (1) to prove that the entire 
market value rule should not apply and (2) to show value in non-
infringing components that would aid a jury in its apportionment 
calculation.  
3. Industry Factor: Nature or Pace of the Industry 
Courts should consider the typical value of incremental change in 
the industry at issue. Although this factor could be a part of the 
Extrinsic Factor discussed above, its importance is too great to bury 
within another analysis. 
 
182. See Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 185 F.3d 1341, 
1353 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“Acceptable substitutes that the infringer proves 
were available during the accounting period can preclude or limit lost 
profits . . . .”). 
183. Love, supra note 52, at 290 (citing United States v. E. I. du Pont de 
Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 393 (1956)).  
184. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 
2009). 
185. TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 899 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
186. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 73, at 2041 (arguing that defendants 
“should be entitled to introduce evidence about prior judgments or 
licenses covering other attributes of the same product”). 
187. See Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1316–17 (Fed. 
Cir. 2011) (citing multiple cases holding that a patentee cannot rely on 
licensing agreements concerning products different from the patent-in-
suit); see also Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1566 (Fed. 
Cir. 1995) (“The Supreme Court has long rejected the view that 
damages are recoupable for the profit attributable to other patents 
embodied in a competitive device of the patentee.”). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 63·Issue 1·2012 
Apportionment: Shining the Light of Day on Patent Damages 
178 
The debate over apportionment has largely been one between 
biotechnology on one side and electronics and software on the other.188 
The pharmaceutical industry is among the strongest opponents of 
apportionment.189 Simply put, drug makers believe that the slow 
incremental nature of the industry would lead to harsh results under 
an apportionment regime.190 To remedy this issue, trial courts should 
consider the nature of the industry in apportionment calculations. 
Courts must recognize that in biotechnology small enhancements over 
the prior art are the norm and provide large increases in commercial 
value over previous products.191 On the contrary, the push for 
apportionment has come largely from the software and electronics 
industries.192 
Though courts may be hesitant to treat different industries 
differently, there is much legislative and regulatory support for giving 
special consideration to intellectual property rights in the biotech 
industry. For example, the recently enacted Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act included a provision granting limited non-patent 
 
188. See Patent Reform in the 111th Congress: Legislation and Recent Court 
Decisions: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 
2–3 (2009) (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter) (“There has been an 
ongoing controversy, really summarized with the high-tech and 
entertainment industry arguing that the entire market value 
methodology is undesirable. There ought to be apportionment of 
damages, and traditional manufacturing and pharmaceuticals are in the 
other direction.”). 
189. See supra notes 100–01 and accompanying text. 
190. One advocate for the pharmaceutical industry and opponent of 
apportionment posits the problem as follows:  
Assume, for example, that a new buffer formulation results in an 
“only” 10% improvement in the shelf life of a biotech drug 
product. Even though the technological advance over the 
preexisting formulation is relatively small, such an improved 
product can take a large market share of the previously-existing 
product because, for example, it allows distributors and 
wholesalers more flexibility in shipping and warehousing and 
reduces the amount of unused, expired product that is returned 
each month. In this example, the royalty award for infringement 
should be based on the significant economic benefit conferred by 
the invention, not on the relatively small technological advance. 
110 Hearing, supra note 18, at 66–67 (statement of Kathryn L. 
Biberstein). 
191. See Editorial, Patent Reform Acts Ugly, 25 Nature Biotechnology 
1187, 1187 (2007) (noting that apportionment—as proposed in 2007—
fails to comprehend situations where “the inventive step might be a 
minor, but vital, sequence change or a nuanced but essential difference 
in a molecular structure”). 
192. See supra notes 90–95 and accompanying text. 
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exclusivity rights to biological products.193 All told, there are at least 
five other types of government-created non-patent exclusivity provi-
sions for biotech products194: (1) new chemical entity exclusivity (five 
years),195 (2) new clinical study exclusivity (three years),196 (3) orphan 
drug exclusivity (seven years),197 (4) pediatric exclusivity (six 
months),198 and (5) generic drug exclusivity (180 days).199 Given the 
regulatory and statutory habit of treating biotech differently, there is 
little reason courts should not do the same. Even Judge Richard 
Posner recently called “[t]he pharmaceutical and software industries 
. . . the extremes so far as the social benefits and costs of patent 
protection are concerned.”200 Courts could recognize biotech’s unique 
nature by instructing a jury, under the Industry Factor, to greatly 
increase a biotech component’s apportionment value.  
Alternatively, rather than considering this a “factor,” courts could 
instruct juries to start an apportionment value at 100 percent and 
work down for biotech patents while starting at 0 and working up for 
patents in other industries. Essentially, this would be a shift in 
burden—for biotech patents the entire market value rule would be 
presumed and the infringer would have to prove apportionment is 
warranted, while for other patents the patentee would have to prove 
the value of its patent. The previously listed exclusivity statutes and 
regulations could serve as a simple guide to what constitutes a biotech 
patent for apportionment purposes.  
In sum, in industries like biotech where small incremental changes 
generally create large economic windfalls, apportionment should be 
higher. Juries should be instructed in a way that raises the 
 
193. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 
§§ 7001–7002, 124 Stat. 804 (2010) (codified in 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7) 
(Supp. IV 2010)). 
194. Alice O. Martin & Sendil K. Devadas, Patents with an “I” = Patients, 
18 Annals Health L. 261, 265 (2009). 
195. Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E)(ii) (2006); 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii) 
(2006); 21 C.F.R. § 314.108(b)(2) (2008)). 
196. Id. (citing 21 C.F.R. § 314.108(b)(4)(iv) (2008)). 
197. Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360cc(a) (2006); 21 C.F.R. § 316.31(a) (2008)). 
198. Id. at 266 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355a(b) (2006)). 
199. Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2006)). 
200  Richard Posner, Do Patent and Copyright Law Restrict Competition 
and Creativity Excessively?, Becker-Posner Blog (Sept. 30, 2012 
10:30 PM), http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2012/09/do-patent-and-
copyright-law-restrict-competition-and-creativity-excessively-posner.html 
(“The problem of excessive patent protection is at present best 
illustrated by the software industry. This is a progressive, dynamic 
industry rife with invention. But the conditions that make patent 
protection essential in the pharmaceutical industry are absent.”).  
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apportionment value accordingly. Contrarily, the software industry is 
one of rapid growth, where small incremental changes matter less. 
Juries should lower the apportionment value to reflect that reality. 
B. The Entire Market Value Rule Does Not Preclude Apportionment 
In Uniloc, the Federal Circuit cautioned against merely shifting 
the royalty rate to compensate for a lower royalty base.201 The court 
believed that mere mention of the entire market value would “skew 
the damages horizon for the jury.”202 But the apportionment proposed 
here is not merely a shift in the royalty rate. Instead, it is a qualifier 
denoting how much weight the jury gave to the entire market value. 
Thus, this framework is not contrary to Uniloc.  
Invoking the entire market value rule within apportionment 
would require a 100 percent apportionment finding. In order for a jury 
to find that 100 percent of the infringing product’s value comes from 
the patented component, a plaintiff should still have to prove that the 
component is the basis for consumer demand. It is irrelevant that the 
entire market value is used in the calculation, because if the 
apportionment finding is less than 100 percent, the actual base is not 
the entire market value. In other words, “[t]here is no need to 
highlight the [entire market value rule] to a jury because it is already 
accounted for in the apportionment calculation.”203 Rather, the entire 
market value rule serves as a marker for the jury—a 100 percent 
value occurs only when the component is the basis for market 
demand. Otherwise, the jury must decide some lesser value based on 
the evidentiary factors—a value that will be listed on the verdict form 
and subject to review for substantial evidence. 
Adding an apportionment qualifier to the entire market value rule 
would likely remove the source of confusion that leads juries to 
skewed damage calculations. Reducing the base by an apportionment 
factor takes the actual dollar amount out of the jury’s damages 
horizon. Further, it is much easier for a judge to see error when a jury 
expressly states the percentage of the entire market value used. 
Otherwise, as is the case now, judges are left to review some 
seemingly arbitrary black-box value derived from the conflicting 
testimony of damage experts. 
 
201. Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 
2011) (“The Supreme Court and this court’s precedents do not allow 
consideration of the entire market value of accused products for minor 
patent improvements simply by asserting a low enough royalty rate.”). 
202. Id. 
203. Merritt J. Hasbrouck, Comment, Protecting the Gates of Reasonable 
Royalty: A Damages Framework for Patent Infringement Cases, 11 
John Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 192, 213 (2011). 
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C. Why a Jury and Not a Judge? 
Some proponents of apportionment believe that the issue should 
be considered as a matter of law—outside the scope of jury 
deliberation.204 Scholars argue that judges can mitigate disparities in 
patent damage awards by assuming a “gate-keeping role” and limiting 
the damage evidence that eventually goes before a jury.205 Similarly, 
the Federal Circuit, in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 
recognized that some issues in patent litigation, such as claim 
construction, are better suited for a judge.206 This is mainly due to 
timing during the litigation process and a desire for uniformity in 
subsequent litigation.207 
Some of the arguments against a separate apportionment 
proceeding illustrate why damage calculations should not be 
bifurcated between a judge and jury. For example, some scholars 
argue that apportionment is inextricably tied to reasonable royalty, 
and thus should not be separated at all.208 As discussed earlier, 
continued reliance on current precedent—where there is no separate 
apportionment—has been ineffective. But apportionment opponents 
illustrate the important point that evidence for both apportionment 
and royalty rate overlap. Indeed, the fact that apportionment was 
considered as a factor in Georgia-Pacific, even if it has been 
underused, demonstrates its place as an important jury consideration.  
This is not to say a judge has no role. Indeed, a trial judge still 
has the most important role—as “gatekeeper”—to ensure that 
evidence produced by the parties is fairly relevant to apportionment 
and reasonable royalty calculations.209 
 
204. Landers, supra note 102, at 509–12. 
205. Id. at 509. 
206. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 970–71 (Fed. Cir. 
1995) aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (holding that claim construction is “a 
matter of law exclusively for the court”). 
207. Markman, 517 U.S. at 390–91. 
208. See, e.g., Megan L. Wiggins, Comment, Patent Reform and Damages 
Apportionment: Addressing the Concerns of Industry-Scale Users of the 
U.S. Patent System Without Legislatively Mandating a “Specific 
Contribution over the Prior Art”, 40 Seton Hall L. Rev. 273, 310 
(2010) (arguing that apportionment would hurt, rather than help, 
patentees).  
209. See Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 
2011) (“Under Daubert, the district court must exercise its ‘gatekeeper’ 
function in ensuring that scientific testimony is relevant and reliable.” 
(citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993))); 
see also Hasbrouck, supra note 203, at 216 (“When judges more 
aggressively utilize their gatekeeper powers . . . juries are presented with 
more reliable and less confusing information to be used when 
determining a reasonable royalty amount.”). 
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IV. The Day Patent in a New Light 
This Part posits how the damage trial in Lucent could have 
proceeded if the court had applied this Note’s proposed framework. 
The hypothetical trial would proceed in two basic steps. First, the 
parties would present evidence addressing the relevant Georgia-
Pacific factors and the relevant apportionment factors fashioned in 
Part III. Then the judge would instruct the jury, for each infringing 
product, to return three findings: (1) the Royalty Base, (2) the 
Apportionment Factor, and (3) the Royalty Rate. 
A. Evidence at Trial 
1. Royalty Base 
The jury must first determine the Royalty Base—the entire 
market value of the product at issue. This determination seems 
simple, but Lucent illustrates that it is no straightforward task. Do 
we apply the apportionment calculation to the value of the Microsoft 
Office suite? Or just Outlook? Or something smaller? The best 
solution is to follow Judge Rader’s advice in Cornell and use the 
“smallest salable infringing unit.”210  
In Lucent, there were two distinct products at issue: the Microsoft 
Office suite and standalone Microsoft Outlook. A royalty base should 
be separately calculated for each. While it may seem overly 
complicated to calculate distinct damage values for each infringing 
product, juries typically do just that.211 Thus, the Royalty Base would 
be the entire market value of either Microsoft Office or Outlook, 
depending on the sale at issue. Evidence of these values would be 
simple—sales records, for example. In this hypothetical case, such 
records should be allowed even though they contain the product’s 
total market value. The jury’s Apportionment Factor calculation will 
prevent a skewed award, as discussed in the following Section. 
2. Apportionment Factor 
Next, the parties would turn to the apportionment factors. The 
parties’ damage experts would begin by estimating an Apportionment 
Value. In the actual trial, Lucent impliedly argued for the entire 
market value.212 Under this Note’s proposed framework, the entire 
market value rule is equivalent to a 100 percent Apportionment 
 
210. Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 609 F. Supp. 2d 279, 288 
(N.D.N.Y. 2009). 
211. See, e.g., Verdict Form at 16, Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 
5:11-cv-01846-LHK (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2012), ECF No. 1930 (itemizing 
damage awards for eighteen distinct alleged infringing products). 
212. Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 
2009). 
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Factor. Lucent would be precluded from arguing for a 100 percent 
value without presenting evidence that the date picker is the basis for 
customer demand for each Microsoft product. It seems unlikely that 
such evidence exists. Lucent could start at a very high figure, say 90 
percent. But the danger is that without sufficient evidence backing 
that high figure, the jury may see Lucent’s expert as not credible. 
Lucent would be wiser to start with a more realistic but still high 
figure, perhaps 10 percent. Lucent’s expert would in essence be saying 
that the date picker comprises 10 percent of the value of the 
Microsoft product. Given the complexity of Microsoft Office and the 
relative unimportance of the Day Patent, Microsoft’s expert would 
start with a very small value, perhaps 1 percent or less.213  
The first Intrinsic Factor is highly relevant in Lucent because the 
Day Patent is such a conceptually small piece of Office as a whole. 
For Office sales, Microsoft would first offer evidence of the sale price 
for each standalone program in Office to show Outlook’s relative 
importance to the Office bundle. Lucent could counter with evidence 
of advertisements for the bundle or surveys showing that consumers 
buy the bundle mostly for Outlook. This evidence would be the 
deciding factor in the differing Apportionment Factors between sales 
of Office and standalone Outlook. 
Next, Microsoft would proffer evidence of the myriad components 
within Outlook, including their number, and perhaps the development 
time and costs associated with each. In response, Lucent would want 
to show that the Day Patent’s touchscreen-only date picker is 
important to the overall function of Outlook. They would likely be 
unable to do so.  
After this, under the Extrinsic Factor, the parties would produce 
evidence of the Day Patent’s effect, or lack thereof, on market 
demand. Lucent would want to produce consumer surveys, Microsoft 
marketing materials, or other evidence showing the importance of the 
Day Patent to Outlook’s sales. Microsoft could bring similar evidence 
showing that it hardly advertised its touch-screen date picker feature. 
Lucent could argue for a greater value by showing that there are no 
alternative designs to the Day Patent, while Microsoft could 
conversely show non-infringing alternatives to support a lower value. 
Finally, the parties would consider the Industry Factor. The 
software industry is perhaps the most complex and fast-paced 
industry in existence. Thus, a lower apportionment value would be 
warranted.214 
 
213. It may be appropriate for a court to set a minimum value. If reasonable 
royalty is meant to be a floor to damage amounts, it should not be zero 
or negligible. There is not yet any de minimis defense to patent 
infringement. 
214. Alternatively, as discussed in Part III.A.3, supra, the Industry Factor 
could instead be a shift in burden to the infringer rather than a factor 
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After considering these factors in the context of evidence and 
testimony, a jury would select a percentage representing the 
Apportionment Factor of the patented components of each infringing 
product. The court could phrase the question as “what percent of the 
total value of Microsoft’s product comes from the Day Patent?” 
Given the values offered by the parties’ experts, the jury would 
choose a value between 10 percent and the less-than 1 percent value 
proffered by Microsoft. The sheer weight of evidence for all factors in 
this case favors Microsoft—and a very low apportionment value. The 
touch-screen date picker is just one of many thousands of Outlook 
features, and not an important one. Lucent would probably be unable 
to produce much evidence that the patented feature swayed consumer 
purchase decisions, or even that the feature was in high use. The jury 
would likely side with Microsoft and choose a value close to 1 percent. 
3. Reasonable Royalty Rate 
The parties would next present any additional evidence relevant 
to the Georgia-Pacific factors. Some of the evidence will overlap with 
the apportionment factors discussed above. Attorneys and experts 
need only point out how each piece of evidence is relevant to each 
factor. The Georgia-Pacific factors and related evidence actually used 
are reviewed thoroughly in the Lucent appeal and need not be 
repeated here.215 The Federal Circuit noted that the parties failed to 
produce substantial evidence on Factor 13—the apportionment 
factor.216 That does not matter, as, in this framework, Factor 13 is 
rendered moot by a distinct apportionment calculation. For the 
purposes of this hypothetical, we will assume that the jury, given the 
same evidence, reached the same reasonable royalty rate of 8 
percent.217 
B. The Jury Verdict 
With the three components determined, the damage calculation is 
simple: multiply the Base Value of the infringing product by both the 
Apportionment Factor and the Royalty Rate. The Base Value in 
Lucent ($8 billion),218 when multiplied by a small Apportionment 
Factor (1 percent in this hypothetical) and the same Royalty Rate (8 
 
for the jury to consider. In this hypothetical, the burden would remain 
on the patentee to prove how much value its patent comprises in the 
parent product. In biotech the burden would shift to the infringer to 
show that its product contains value aside from the infringing 
component. 
215. Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1325–36. 
216. Id. at 1332. 
217. Id. at 1323. 
218. Id. 
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percent),219 would result in a lump-sum reasonable royalty of 
approximately $6.4 million.220 That award is nearly identical to the 
amount that the infringer, Microsoft, had proposed—a result the 
Federal Circuit seemed to call “economically justified.”221 
A simple jury verdict form would contain three blank spaces for 
each determined value: Base Value, Apportionment Factor, and 
Royalty Rate. The spaces would be followed by an instruction to 
multiply all three numbers together to calculate the final lump sum 
award. 
Conclusion 
The benefit of apportionment, as outlined in this Note, is clear 
when applied to Lucent. In that case, the patented date-picker feature 
was merely one of dozens of components in the software, and not a 
significant feature when compared to the software’s main e-mail func-
tionality. Had the jury been instructed, based on testimony and 
evidence, to derive a percentage value for the date-picker compared to 
the software as a whole and the component’s market effects, the 
amount would have likely been small. Also, an apportionment 
proceeding would vastly increase the types of evidence that parties 
could introduce at trial. This would reduce costly and protracted 
evidentiary disputes and leave a clear record for review. 
Josh Friedman † 
 
219. Id. 
220. $8,000,000,000 × 0.01 × 0.08 = $6,400,000.  
221. See Lucent, 580 F.3d at 1339 (“Microsoft surely would have little reason 
to complain about the supposed application of the entire market value 
rule had the jury applied a royalty rate of 0.1% (instead of 8%) to the 
market price of the infringing programs. Such a rate would have likely 
yielded a damages award of less than Microsoft’s proposed $6.5 million. 
Thus, even when the patented invention is a small component of a much 
larger commercial product, awarding a reasonable royalty based on 
either sale price or number of units sold can be economically justified.”). 




   
